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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: A MORE REALISTIC
APPROACH
CAsEs in nearly every jurisdiction have stated that since the law ap-
proves the unfettered use of real property, "restritive covenants, being
in derogation of the fee, are not favored by the law."' Thus, the rule
of construction has evolved that such covenants are to be strictly in-
terpreted in favor of the free utilization of land and against those per-
sons seeking to enforce the restriction.2
The case of Leavitt v. DaZs 3 has followed this traditional rule.
There, the owners of seashore property had divided the land into two
lots, and had sold the back lot in 1898 to the predecessors in interest of
the plaintiff. The deed contained a restrictive covenant in which the
grantors agreed that upon the parcel of land lying in front of the con-
veyed lot, "they will erect or maintain no building or structure of such a
character as to interrupt or interfere with the view over said parcel" from
the rear lot. The defendants, successors to the servitude lot bordering
the sea, established a public parking facility for automobiles, trucks, and
busses on their property. While it was admitted by all parties that the
parking of these vehicles interfered with the view to the sea from the
plaintiff's lot, the decisive issue was whether such conduct by the de-
fendants violated the restrictive covenant.
The plaintiff won a decree in equity enjoining defendants from con-
tinuing their parking lot business on the retricted premises, but the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reversed, holding that motor vehicles
are not "buildings or structures" and, thus, that their presence did not
violate the covenant. The court reasoned basically that "a restrictive
'See McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Ky. 19,53), where the court made
the above observation and then proceeded to criticize the strictness of such a view. For
cases finding disfavor with restrictive covenants, see Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. xSs,
x55 AtI. 3r6 (1931); Tripp v, Fay, 264 Mass. Sx6, x63 N.E. 174 (x928); Schultheis
v. Wohileb, 231 App. Div. 851, 246 N.Y.S. 485 (1930); 26 C.J.S., Deedi § x63
(1956).
'Moses v. Hazen, 63 App. D.C. o4, 69 F.2d 84z (1934); Weston v. Foreman, 1o8
Cal. App.2d 686, 239 P.zd 513 (x952); Connor v. Anderson, 104 Ind. App. 6z8, 8
N.E.2d 422 (1937).
x 153 Me. 279, 136 A.2d 535 (-9S7).
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covenant ought not to be extended by construction beyond the fair mean-
ing of the words."4
The dissenting judge contended that in interpreting restrictive cov-
enants, primary emphasis should be placed upon ascertaining the actual
intent of the parties to the instrument, which intent should not be de-
termined solely by a strict reading of isolated words used in the covenant,
but rather should be discovered with the aid of all pertinent facts and
circumstances known to and relied upon by the parties. He concluded
that the purpose of the covenant was to insure to the covenantee an un-
obstructed view to the sea and that this purpose should be given full
effect."
From a careful examination, both of the covenant itself and of the
surrounding circumstances, it would appear that the majority of the
court has allowed the defendants to defeat the real purpose of the
covenant through the employment of a strict, technical construction.
While the court held, in accordance with the traditional view, that the
parties are to be confined to the meaning of the language used and that
it is improper to consider either the surrounding circumstances or the
purposes of the grant or restriction in aid of its construction, 6 such a rule
seems to have but little modern social value. Many jurisdictions, in
line with the contemporary desire for reasonable regulation of land use,
exemplified by such accepted measures as zoning and building codes,
have recognized that restrictive covenants are to be regarded more as a
protection to the land owner and to the public and less as a limitation
upon the use of property.7 Moreover, if this protection has been bar-
gained for, it would seem especially desirable that the courts give effect
to such covenants.
The interpretation of a bilateral agreement must be based on the
intent of both parties-the normal expectations of the grantee, as well as
the desires of the grantor.8 Under the facts of the instant case, it requires
A 136 A.zd at 537.
"'The view was one of the important incidents of the transaction .... Obstruc-
tion and interference, of any kind, other than 'building or structure' would, in fact,
destroy what the parties intended to accomplish2 x36 A.2d at 540.
'Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951); England
v. Atkinson, x96 Ga. 1S1, 26 S.E.zd 431 (1943) i Phillips v. Naff, 331 Mich. 389, 52
N.W.2d xSS (1952).
'Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.2d 733 (z956); McFarland v. Hanley,
258 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. x953); Salerno v. DeLucca, 2xi La. 659, 30 So.2d 67 8 (x947).
* "Conveyances which do not operate gratuitously are made upon the basis of mutual
reliance by the parties to them. Each party relies upon a meaning which the other
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little imagination to conclude that the grantee expected to receive an
uninterrupted prospect toward the sea, unquestionably one of the more
valuable attributes of seashore residence property. Although the desires
of the grantor may be more difficult to ascertain, it seems plausible to
conclude that he meant to make the property attractive to purchasers by
guaranteeing an unobstructed view to the sea. The use of the dis-
junctive "or" in the restriction against any "building or structure" seems
to evince an intent to broaden the class of forbidden obstructions beyond
the category of "buildings" to include any man-made object placed in
the line of view. In light of these indications of intent, the narrow in-
terpretation adopted by the court appears to be in complete disharmony
with the dominant purpose of the covenant.
The sounder view, which is gaining considerable ground, is that
archaic constructional rules operating against the restrictive use of prop-
erty will not be applied indiscriminately so as to defeat the obvious pur-
pose of a restrictive covenant.1" Thus, the marked tendency of the courts
is to extend the meaning of such a term as "building" to include struc-
Lures that ordinarily would not come within the strict definition of the
word when the intent of the parties seems to so dictate." This trend is
appeared to indicate or express .... To give effect to the point of view of one in dis-
regard of the reasonable expectations of the other would produce an obviously unfair re-
suit." RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY § 483, comment h (1944). Accord, Hannula v. Ha-
cienda Homes, 34 Cal.2d 442, 444, 211 P.ad 302, 304 (1949), where the court said:
"... the primary object in construing restrictive covenants, as in construing all contracts,
should be to effectuate the legitimate desires of the covenating parties." See also Utah
Constr. Co. v. McIlwee, 45 Idaho 707, 266 P. 1094 (1928); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Robertson, 243 Ky. 584, 49 S.W.2d 335 (1932).
9 In at least two cases an intent to protect the view was found as "obvious," although
no reference to the obstruction of view or prospect was even mentioned in the covenants.
See Curtis v. Schmidt, 212 Iowa 1279, 237 N.W. 463, 465 (1931) (land situated near
scenic river; the surrounding circumstances furnished "persuasive evidence that the
grantors desired to protect the view across the restricted area.') ; Perkins v. Young, z66
Wis. 33, 6z N.W.2d 435 (954).
"
0A leading case for this view is Library Neighborhood Ass'n v. Goosen, 229
Mich. 89, 2o N.W. 219, 220 (1924), where the court said: ". . . under the circum-
stances of this case, the rights of the parties are not to be determined by a literal in-
terpretation of the restriction. It is to be construed in connection with the surrounding
circumstances, which the parties are supposed to have had in mind at the time they made
it, the location and character of the entire tract of land, [and] the purpose of the
restriction-whether it was for the sole benefit of the grantor or for the benefit of the
grantee and subsequent purchasers. . . ." For other cases applying this reasoning, see
Hallet v. Sumpter, xo6 F. Supp. 996 (D.C. Alaska 1952) 5 Brown v. Hojnacki, 270
Mich. 557, 259 N.W. 152 (1935)5 Perkins v. Young, supra note 9.
"
1Netter v. Scholtz, 282 Ky. 493, 138 S.W.2d 951, 953 (1940) ("building" in-
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illustrated by a case12 in which a covenant against the erection of any
"building" was held to preclude the construction of a wooden super-
structure for screening sand and gravel, the court reasoning that the
apparent purpose of the prohibition was to guarantee an unobstructed
view. Coming nearer to the facts of Leavitt v. Davis, several juris-
dictions have broadly construed certain restrictions against "buildings" to
include mobile trailer homes where the presence of such parked vehicles
has been felt to violate the spirit of the covenants.' 3 In accord with
such reasoning is Wigmore's view' 4 that terms employed in contracts
eludes "any character of structure according to the connection in which it is used and
the purpose sought to be effected by its use") ; Bagiano v. Harrow, 247 Mich. 481, 2=6
N.W. 262 ('929) (a wall may constitute a "building") i Perkins v. Young, 266 Wis.
33, 62 N.W.2d 435 (1954) ("building" held to include any structure obstructing the
view). For other examples, see cases cited note 13 infra.
Contra, Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, 384 Pa. 268, zo A.±d 535, 537
(x956) (". . . nothing will be deemed a violation of a restriction that is not in plain
disregard of its express words."); Katsoff v. Lucertini, 141 Conn. 74, 103 A.2d 8m±
(-954) (although purpose of the covenant was to safeguard air, light, and view, "build-
ing" did not include billboards).
SCurtis v. Schmidt, 212 Iowa 1279, 237 N.W. 463 (193). "When we consider
the purpose of the restriction in this case as shown by the evidence and the facts and
circumstances appearing in the case, and from all of which it satisfactorily appears that
the primary purpose of the grantor was to retain a view from the grantor's premises...
it follows, in the light of the better reasoned of the adjudicated cases, that the structures
erected and maintained on the restricted area are covered by the restrictions." Id. at
1±87, 237 N.W. 463.
"' Brubaker v. Sander, 52 LANcAsTEa L. REv. 267, 271 (Ct. C. P., Lancaster County,
Pa. i9 5 x)-"The operation of a trailer camp is not in accord with the obvious intent
of the restrictions," which was to maintain the residential character of the lots by pro-
hibiting the construction of "buildings" on the rear of the premises. Accord, Hallet v.
Sumpter, xo6 F. Supp. 996 (D.C. Alaska 95z ); Grange v. Korff, 248 Iowa ±±8, 79
N.W.±d 743 (1956); Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 79 N.W.±d 733 (1956). In all
three of these cases the courts found in the restrictive covenants an implicit general
plan to maintain a residential character.
Opposing such liberal construction is Foos v. Engle, 295 Ky. 114, 174 S.W.zd 5, 9
(1943), where the court refused to enjoin the operation of a mobile trailer park, saying:
"While 'trailers' are aptly described by appellant as qittle houses on wheels,' they are
not 'erected' within the meaning of the restriction which refers, in ordinary parlance, to
a residence designed to be more or less permanent, and hence, attached to the soil."
""The truth had finally to be recognized that words always need interpretation;
that the process of interpretation inherently and invariably means the ascertainment of
the association between words and external objects. ... Once freed from the primitive
formalism which views the document as a self-contained and self-operative formula, we
can fully appreciate the modern principle that the words of a document are never
anything but indices to extrinsic things, and that therefore all the circumstances must
be considered which go to make clear the sense of the words--that is, their association
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always need interpretation in order to determine the proper association
between the words and the external objects to which they refer.
Authority opposed to the above reasoning contends that in inter-
preting restrictive covenants the courts ought not to go beyond the
"plain meaning" of the terms in the instrument, since only then can
there be "certainty" in such covenants. 5  Even disregarding the policy
of effectuating the purpose of the parties by looking to the surrounding
circumstances, however, past interpretations indicate that the court in
Leavitt v. Davis would not have been acting aberrantly had it in-
cluded vehicles within the "plain meaning" of the word "structure?'
In ordinary usage, "structure" refers to something constructed or built."0
Courts have defined the term to mean "any production or piece of work
'artificially built up,' 7 and a product "composed of parts joined together
in some definite manner." 8 Vehicles, even though movable, could
arguably be held to fall within these broad definitions. Thus, in inter-
preting a zoning ordinance it has been held that a trailer house comes
within the meaning of structure.'9 A passenger car undergoing repairs
is a structure for the purpose of construing workmen's compensation
laws,20 as is a railroad car 2' or a locomotive.22 On the other hand, courts
have held that movable machinery,23 a threshing machine,24 and a
moving train25 do not come within the definition of structure. Thus,
it appears that the "plain meaning" of a term frequently is not altogether
plain and that the precise meaning must often depend upon the context
with things." 9 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 247o, at 227 (3 d ed. 1940). See also 3 COR-
BIN, CONTRACS §§ 536, 539 (x95x). Contra, 29 CONN. B.J. 268 (1955).
. 'Katsoff v. Lucertini, 141 Conn. 74, 103 A.zd 8x2 (1954), noted in 29 CONN.
B.J. 268 (1955)5 Connor v. Anderson, io4 Ind. App. 628, 8 N.E.2d 422 (1937)$
American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. o9o, 16 A.zd 912 (1940).
WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY z5OI (zd ed. 1948).
1 fDetroit Trust Co. v. Austin, 291 Mich. 523, 289 N.W. 239, 240 (1939).
" United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 22 F.zd 731, 733
(5th Cir. 1927).
" City of Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.zd 62 (1955).
0 Caddy v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 125 App. Div. 68x, 11o N.Y.$. z6z
(1908),
" Corbett v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 151 App. Div. 159, 135 N.Y.S. 137
(1912).
"Loesch v. Long Island R. Co., 165 App. Div. 753, 15i N.Y.S. 499 (1915).
,"Borough of Cheswick v. Bechman, 352 Pa. 79, 42 A.zd 6o (1945) (zoning
ordinance).
"Barnes V. Montana Lumber and Hardware Co., 67 Mont. 481, 216 Pac. 335
(19-3) (mechanics' liens statute).
"Lee v. Town of Barkbampsted, 46 Conn. 213 (2878) (tort liability statute).
IVoL.1959: 310DUKE LAW JOURNAL314
Vol. 1959: 310] RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
in which the term is used. These variations in semantic interpretation
serve to demonstrate the inadequacies of the "plain meaning rule."
Another possibility is that the court in the instant case might have
effectuated the underlying intent of the covenanting parties by finding
that an easement had been created by the restrictive covenant. Accord-
ing to many cases,16 a negative easement may be created by words of
covenant which "sound in grant." To attain such a result, the covenant,
regardless of the particular form of words used, must be for the present
enjoyment of a right or interest which is capable of being the subject
of a grant as an easement.2r To satisfy this requirement, the interest
must be deemed a jus in rem, rather than merely the subject of a per-
sonal undertaking;2" in addition, it must be generally recognized as
coming within the closely limited class of interests transferable by ease-
ment.29 That an easement of prospect or view, like that of air or light,
meets such requirements has become widely accepted in recent years30
"'A leading case for this line of authority is Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538
(1887), where the court held that a covenant restricting the erection of a building on
a strip of land resulted in an easement. Speaking for the court, Holmes, J., said: "There
is no doubt that an easement may be created by words sounding in covenant?' For other
cases following this view, see Scheuer v. Britt, 217 Ala. 196, 115 So. 237 (1928) ; Miller
v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272 (1954) ("Of course the claimed
agreement was designed to create an interest in land .... It contemplated the creation
of a restrictive or negative easement over defendant's premises in favor of the adjoin-
ing premises."); Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211 N.C. 166, 189 S.E. 6z8
('937) ; Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 131 W. Va. 391, 47 S.E.2d 454 (1948).
The opposing view is that an easement in land can be created only by express grant,
by operation of law, or by prescription. Moses v. Hazen, 63 App. D.C. io4, 69 F.2d
842 (1934) (restrictive covenants do not create true easements, but merely contractual
rights) ; Hancock v. Gumm, 5x5 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921); Welitoff v. Kohl, io5
N.J. Eq. 181, 147 Atl. 390 (1929) (not an estate in land as is an easement, but purely
a creature of equity arising out of contract).
J GALE, EASEMENTS 83 (Oth ed. 1925)5 Hogan v. Barry, supra note 26.
"If the seeming covenant is for a present enjoyment of a nature recognized by the
law as capable of being conveyed and made an easement,---capable, that is to say, of
being treated as a jus in rem, and as not merely the subject of a personal undertaking,--
and if the deed discloses that the coverant is for the benefit of adjoining land conveyed
at the same time .... An easement will be created and attached to the land conveyed,
and will pass with it to assigns. . . . Hogan v. Barry, 143 Mass. 538 (1887).
"' "Whether a particular privilege of use of land in the possession of another may be
deemed an entity so as to enable it to be conveyed [as an easement] depends in part
upon the recognition the use has previously received. . . . Out of the infinite variety
of possible privileges of use of land relatively few have received recognition in the law
as property interests." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 450, comment 1 (1944).
" Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954) (easement of view);
Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 16o Md. 457, 154
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To create an easement by covenant, the parties must further evidence
an intent to confer a benefit upon the dominant land conveyed simul-
taneously with the execution of the covenant, with resulting creation of
a burden on the remaining servient land of the grantor.31 In deter-
mining the existence of such intention, some courts have held that the
covenant should be interpreted in the light of the general purpose of
the parties and of the conditions existing when the agreement was
made.82 It might well be argued under the facts of Leavitt v. Davis
that the parties, intending such a benefit and burden, created an interest
in the nature of an easement. If such a negative easement of view were
found, the rights of the grantee and his assigns presumably would in-
dude protection against such unsightly obstructions as those resulting
from defendant's parking lot business.
Because of the inherent imperfections of language and the resulting
fact that law cannot irrevocably fix the meaning of words, perhaps the
court in the present case would have been wiser in holding that the tra-
ditional rule of strict and conceptualistic interpretation of restrictive
covenants should not be allowed to defeat the reasonably ascertained
purpose of the covenant. The primary objective of the courts should be
to effectuate the legitimate desires of the contracting parties indicated
not only by the instrument itself, but by the clear direction of evidence
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
Atl. 58 (193) (light and air). "It is universally assumed, without controversy, that
easements of light, air, and view may be created. . . .. Annot., 142 A.L.R. 467, 468
(1943).
"
1 See note 78 supra; Beck v. Lane County, 141 Ore. 580, ig P.zd 594 (1933);
"ALE, op. cit. supra note 27 at 83.
32 Irving Trust Co. v. Anahma Realty Corp., 285 N.Y. 416, 35 N.E.2d 2! (5941);
Murphy v. Ahlberg, 252 Pa. 267, 97 At!. 406 (1916); Huntington Presbyterian Con-
gregation v. Stewart, 8 Pa. D. & C. 691 (1926).
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